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RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: ARE 
EDUCATORS ROCK STARS? 
Stijepko Tokic, J.D., LL.M.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rock stars sometimes get sued over the quality of their 
performances on the stage.1 One of the more recent highly 
publicized lawsuits featured the performance of the rock band 
Creed at the Allstate Arena in Rosemont, Illinois.2 In that case, 
the lead singer allegedly mumbled through his lyrics, gave the 
appearance of intoxication, rolled around on the floor of the 
stage, and eventually left his band mates for extended periods 
of time.3 Ultimately, some fans filed a class action suit over the 
quality of the band’s performance, or lack thereof.4 
Unfortunately for the fans, but fortunately for the 
entertainment industry, the lawsuit was not successful. 
The main reason why the lawsuit was not successful is the 
fact that American jurisprudence does not allow for “causes of 
action based on the disappointment of subjective consumer 
expectations within the live performance industry.”5 As 
explained by one commentator, 
 
* Stijepko Tokic is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at the Northeastern Illinois 
University in Chicago, Illinois. He acknowledges, with much appreciation, Ilina 
Lazarova’s research assistance, and the support he received from the Title V Promoting 
Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for Hispanic Americans Grant. He can be reached at 
s-tokic@neiu.edu. 
 1 See e.g., Kass v. Young, 136 Cal. Rptr. 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Neil Young 
concert attendee filed a class action against the performer after Young performed for 
only an hour because of the oppressive behavior exhibited by security personnel at the 
venue).  
 2 Lara Weber & Drew Sottardi, Creed Fans Sue Over Show, RedEye, CHI. TRIB., 
Apr. 22, 2003, at 6. 
 3 Eric Gwinn, Some Creed Fans are Singing a Different Tune After Concert, 
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2003, 5 (Tempo), at 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Brian A. Rosenblatt, I Know, It’s Only Rock and Roll, But Did They Like It?: 
An Assessment of Causes of Action Concerning the Disappointment of Subjective 
Consumer Expectations Within the Live Performance Industry, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
33, 53 (2005). 
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Existing case law shows that the purchase of a ticket to a live 
event is nothing more than the purchase of a license that 
entitles the purchaser to enter and remain in the venue for 
the event, and perhaps entitles the purchaser to some form of 
performance. By no means does the purchase of a ticket 
entitle the purchaser to any level of quality in an event or 
performance.6 
When it comes to rock shows, this approach seems 
appropriate. Historically speaking, “spontaneity” and 
“unpredictability” have been paramount to rock shows, and 
courts should not “dictate how rock performers must behave.”7 
Moreover, it is possible that some fans might actually embrace 
the experience of an unorganized and chaotic concert. Without 
a doubt, concert attendees could form entirely different 
perceptions about the duration and quality of the show based 
on a mood on any given day, relative familiarity with a 
particular band, or a music genre. Therefore, it is easy to see 
why a ticket to a concert cannot guarantee any particular level 
of quality of performance. However, does the same hold true for 
the education industry? Should a “ticket” to the classroom 
guarantee more than a right to enter and remain in the 
classroom during the scheduled class? Should the purchase of a 
“ticket” to a classroom entitle the purchaser to any level of 
quality in the educators’ performance? Unfortunately, the 
United States “Supreme Court has never provided guidance on 
what students have [the] right to expect as consumers of an 
educational product.”8 
Quality has long been on the agenda of many education-
related discussions, and the relative quality of educational 
institutions is increasingly measured by the quality of their 
output—that is, student learning.9 The issue of quality in the 
 
 6 Id. at 37.  
 7 See Memorandum and Order from Judge Peter Flynn, Berenz v. Diamond Rd., 
Inc., No. 03 CH 7106 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ch. Div., July 13, 2004) (Judge Flynn 
also quipped in his oral opinion regarding plaintiff’s first complaint that “rock singers 
are—at least so [The] Rolling Stones would like us to believe—the unconstrained 
element in our society. Lawyers are the precise opposite.”). See also Transcript and 
Proceedings at 40, Judge Peter Flynn, Sept. 10, 2003, Berenz v. Diamond Rd., Inc., No. 
03 CH 7106, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ch. Div., July 13, 2004).  
 8 Sarah Anjum, Students as Consumers: Finding and Applying a Workable 
Standard when Institutions Fail to Give the Benefit of the Bargain, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 
151, 155 (2011). 
 9 The controversial large-scale standardized testing, designed to measure 
students’ proficiency in certain key areas, has become prevalent in evaluating the 
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educational context becomes very interesting in light of many 
court decisions that have dealt with the issue of educational 
malpractice. Tort lawsuits for educational malpractice have 
been brought against all kinds of educational institutions, 
including primary and secondary education institutions,10 
institutions of higher education,11 professional schools,12 and so 
on. Moreover, lawsuits for educational malpractice have even 
been brought against accrediting associations.13 Notably, courts 
have repeatedly rejected claims for educational malpractice on 
the principle that can be summarized as, “the failure to learn 
does not bespeak a failure to teach.”14 Although commentators 
have articulated many theories of educational malpractice,15 
and the courts continue to hear educational malpractice cases,16 
educational malpractice is still merely “a tort theory beloved of 
 
effectiveness of primary and secondary education institutions. See Rebecca Klein, Arne 
Duncan’s AERA Speech: Standardized Test Criticism ‘Is Merited,’ HUFFINGTON POST, 
May 2, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/02/arne-duncan-aera-speech-
standardized-tests_n_3196437.html. See also Valerie Strauss, Letter from disgusted 
teacher: “I quit,” THE WASHINGTON POST, October 29, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/29/letter-from-
disgusted-teacher-i-quit. Organizations, such as the Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB), which provides a prestigious AACSB accreditation to 
business schools, has a whole chapter on Assurance of Learning in its accreditation 
standards. See AACSB INTERNATIONAL, Assurance of Learning Overview and Intent of 
Standards, http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/business/standards/aol/defining_aol.asp 
(last visited May 28, 2013). 
 10 See infra note 24. 
 11 See e.g. Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d 
546, 713 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 12 See infra note 16. 
 13 See Ambrose v. New Eng. Ass’n of Schs. & Colleges, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 48, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7999 (D. Me. 2000). The lawsuit was filed by seven former 
students against NEACE, the accrediting association for Thomas College, the 
institution where they obtained associate degrees in “medical assisting.” The plaintiffs 
enrolled in the medical assisting program expecting it to qualify them for entry-level 
positions as medical assistants. According to the court, the medical assisting program 
had no clinical component. Because clinical tasks form a large part of a medical 
assistant’s job, six of the seven plaintiffs were unable to find employment as medical 
assistants. The seventh plaintiff obtained a job but lost it due her inadequate 
knowledge and training. In their suit, the plaintiffs charged NEACE with fraud, 
misrepresentation, and deceptive business practices based on the association’s 
accreditation of the college.  
 14 Donohue v. Copiague Union Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (N.Y.A.D. 
1978).  
 15 See infra notes 78–89. 
 16 Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., No. 652226/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 
2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., F. Supp. 2d 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D. 
Mich. July 20, 2012); Love v. Career Educ. Corp., 2012 WL 1684572 (E.D. Mo. May 15, 
2012); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012 (Ill. App.) LEXIS 133, 
359, Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012). 
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commentators, but not of courts.”17 So far, courts have upheld 
some breach of contract claims against educational institutions, 
but only in situations where an institution has failed to fulfill 
some very specific promises to its students, such as a promise 
to provide tutoring.18 
This Article argues against using an output-based approach 
in determining quality and legal liability of educational 
institutions. The Article points out that, unlike in education, 
the perceived quality of performance and malpractice liability 
in other service-oriented industries, such as the medical and 
legal industries, is overwhelmingly input/conduct-based.19 
Naturally, this Article argues in favor of adopting an 
input/conduct-based approach to educational malpractice, 
where instructors’ and institutions’ conducts are separately 
assessed, as is the case in medical malpractice cases.20 In 
particular, the Article suggests that liability of educational 
institutions should be determined solely by assessing whether 
an institution has and enforces internal quality assurance 
mechanisms that ought to promote the fulfillment of the 
institutions’ own stated objectives, mission, and obligations. 
The Article ultimately seeks to establish that recognizing 
claims for educational malpractice based on institutional 
negligence could play a vital role in promoting the quality and 
accountability of educational institutions, without causing 
undue hardship for administrators. Without change, educators 
and their institutions will continue to be treated just like rock 
stars, which does not foster an environment for enhancing the 
quality and accountability of educational institutions. 
This Article is divided as follows: Part II reviews leading 
educational malpractice cases, explains the legal and policy 
grounds for rejecting educational malpractice claims, and 
underlines why the current framework for analyzing 
educational malpractice claims is inappropriate and legally 
unsound. Part III addresses the question of whether a “ticket” 
to a classroom entitles students to any level of quality of 
educational services, or merely the right to be in the classroom 
for a specific period of time as the current law implies. Part III 
explores predominantly foreign authority about the nature and 
 
 17 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 18 Id. at 1331–32. 
 19 See infra notes 40–50.  
 20 See infra notes 104–110. 
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concept of quality in education, and ultimately argues that 
“fitness for purpose” is the most appropriate definition of 
quality in the educational context. Part IV relies on the “fitness 
for purpose” definition of quality to articulate a cause of action 
for institutional negligence, and explains why this approach is 
more legally sound than the current approach to educational 
malpractice. Part IV also discusses potential criticisms of using 
a concept of institutional negligence in the education industry, 
namely the burden on administrators and academic freedom 
issues. 
Additionally, the scope of this article is limited in the 
following ways: The courts have articulated three broad 
categories of educational malpractice claims: “(1) the student 
alleges that the school negligently failed to provide him with 
adequate skills; (2) the student alleges that the school 
negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose his learning or 
mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the school 
negligently supervised his training.”21 This Article is primarily 
concerned with the first category of educational malpractice 
claims. Furthermore, the Article only addresses educational 
malpractice claims based on tort law, as scholars and 
commentators have already explored numerous grounds for 
holding educators liable based on causes of action outside of 
tort law.22 Finally, while the main thesis of this Article can 
conceptually be applied to educational institutions of all kinds, 
it is likely to be most useful in the post-secondary setting. 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As articulated by one court, “the term ‘educational 
malpractice’ has a seductive ring to it; after all, if doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, and other professionals can be held liable 
for failing to exercise due care, why can’t teachers?”23 To be 
 
 21 Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2008). 
 22 See e.g. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for 
Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1768(1995). 
 23 The court answered its question by stating, 
The answer is that the nature of education radically differs from other professions. 
Education is an intensely collaborative process, requiring the interaction of 
student with teacher. A good student can learn from a poor teacher; a poor student 
can close his mind to a good teacher. Without effort by a student, he cannot be 
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sure, claims for educational malpractice have been raised as 
early as 1976,24 and as recently as 2012.25 While educational 
malpractice cases can be brought on the basis of various legal 
theories ranging from breach of contract26 to intentional torts 
such as misrepresentation,27 educational malpractice claims 
are generally brought under the theory of negligence where a 
successful plaintiff must establish the following prima facie 
elements: (1) existence of a legal duty of care owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of the legal duty by the 
defendant; (3) causation between the defendant’s acts, or 
failure to act, and the plaintiff ’s injuries suffered; and (4) 
damages suffered by the plaintiff.28 
Courts have identified multiple reasons that counsel 
against allowing claims for educational malpractice under the 
theory of negligence. First, there is the lack of a satisfactory 
standard of care by which to evaluate an educator.29 Theories of 
education are not uniform, and “different but acceptable 
scientific methods of academic training [make] it unfeasible to 
formulate a standard by which to judge the conduct of those 
delivering the services.”30 Second, when it comes to causation, 
 
educated. Good teaching method may vary with the needs of the individual 
student. In other professions, by contrast, client cooperation is far less important; 
given a modicum of cooperation, a competent professional in other fields can 
control the results obtained. But in education, the ultimate responsibility for 
success remains always with the student. Both the process and the result are 
subjective, and proof or disproof extremely difficult. 
Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1338 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 24 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976).  
 25 Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., No. 652226/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21. 
2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., F. Supp. 2d 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D. 
Mich. July 20, 2012); Love v. Career Educ. Corp., 2012 WL 1684572 (E.D. Mo. May 
15,2012); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 133, 
359 Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012). 
 26 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City Univ. (OCU), 6 P.3d 509, 515 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2000).  
 27 See Love, 2012 WL 1684572.  
 28 See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
30, at 164–65 (5th ed.1984); See Michael J. Polelle, Who’s on First, and What’s a 
Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 206 (1999). (“Judicial intervention in the specific 
professions of medicine and law has largely molded the malpractice law applied to all 
professionals.”).  
 29 Smith v. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941; 153 Cal. 
Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979). 
 30 Swidryk v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 201 N.J. Super. 601, 493 A.2d 641, 643 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.1985) (citing Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 
Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976)). 
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educational malpractice cases inherently entail uncertainties 
when it comes to the cause and nature of damages.31 “Factors 
such as the student’s attitude, motivation, temperament, past 
experience and home environment may all play an essential 
and immeasurable role in learning.”32 Consequently, it may be 
a “practical impossibility [to prove] that the alleged malpractice 
of the teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the 
plaintiff student.”33 
Besides “practical” reasons, courts have also articulated 
multiple policy reasons that counsel against allowing claims for 
educational malpractice under the theory of negligence. The 
first reason is the fear of a potential flood of litigation against 
schools.34 As one district court noted, “education is a service 
rendered on an immensely greater scale than other 
professional services.”35 Consequently, the potential number of 
claims that could arise if educational malpractice causes of 
action were allowed might overburden schools.36 Yet another 
policy concern courts have cited is the fear that an educational 
malpractice cause of action could entangle the courts into 
overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools,37 which might 
be particularly inappropriate in the university setting due to 
considerations of academic freedom and autonomy.38 
Ultimately, in light of the enumerated practical and policy 
reasons, courts have found that a common-law tort remedy 
may not be the best way to deal with the problem of inadequate 
education.39 
A. The Wrong-Headed Approach? 
According to its dictionary meaning, malpractice literally 
means “bad practice.”40 In fact, scholars have long recognized 
 
 31 Helm v. Professional Children’s School, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246, 246–47 (App. Term 
1980). 
 32 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, (N.Y. 
1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114–15 (Iowa 1986). 
 35 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 36 Id.  
 37 Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354; Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 
(N.Y. 1979). Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982). 
 38 Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115. 
 39 Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1329. 
 40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 959 (6th ed. 1990). 
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that “the standard [for malpractice] is one of conduct, rather 
than consequences.”41 In the legal industry, a lawyer commits 
malpractice “by giving an erroneous legal opinion or erroneous 
advice, by delaying or failing to handle a matter entrusted to 
the lawyer’s care, or by not using a lawyer’s ordinary care in 
preparing, managing, and prosecuting a case.”42 For example, 
in one case, an attorney who did not specialize in the area of 
family law represented a woman in a divorce case, and the 
court found that the attorney’s failure to research the issue of 
the community property nature of her client’s husband’s 
military pension constituted malpractice.43 Other types of 
behavior that can lead to a legal malpractice claim include 
[f]ailure to know the law, inadequate investigation, missed 
statute of limitations, conflict of interest, errors or omissions 
that result in a lawsuit being dismissed, billing fraud, 
improper legal advice, dishonest, breach of fiduciary duty, 
obstruction of justice, failure to inform a client or get a client’s 
consent, [and] failure to follow client instructions.44 
Similarly, in the medical industry, a medical professional is 
liable for malpractice when she/he does not meet the acceptable 
standard of care, such as in a recent “blockbuster” case where a 
jury awarded $6.7 million dollars to a widow whose husband 
died from injuries caused by internal bleeding.45 The lawsuit 
was based on allegations that the doctor failed to follow up on 
the indications of internal bleeding, as he did not issue an 
order for follow-up X-rays to monitor the internal bleeding.46 
Other negligence incidents that can lead to medical malpractice 
are “misdiagnosis, failure to diagnose in time, surgical error, 
failure to follow up with treatment, failure to treat in a timely 
manner, anesthesia error, [and] . . . prescription error.”47 
 
 41 KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 170. 
 42 Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 692 (Tex. App. Dallas, 2007). 
 43 See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), (overruled on other grounds by 
In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976)).  
 44 See Legal Malpractice Lawsuit, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, 
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/legal-malpractice.html#.UQar7IXQm0I 
(last visited May 21, 2013). 
 45 Judy Harrison, Jury Awards Widow $6.7 Million in Medical Malpractice 
Lawsuit, BANGORDAILYNEWS.COM (June 14, 2011, at 1:59 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/06/14/news/bangor/jury-awards-widow-6-7-million-in-
medical-malpractice-lawsuit/. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. See also Medical Malpractice, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, 
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/medical_malpractice.html#.UQsWuoX
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Examples from the legal and medical industry clearly 
indicate that malpractice liability is not outcome/consequences 
based. As put by one commentator while addressing 
educational malpractice issues, 
[p]atients die and clients go to jail. The outcome of the 
rendering of professional services is not always positive. 
‘[C]ourts recognize that part of being a professional includes 
making judgment calls that may not always guarantee a 
positive result.’ The issue, generally, is whether or not the 
professional rendered the expected service. Following the 
examples from medicine and law, the issue would not be 
whether the student learned, but whether the educator 
rendered the instruction that would be expected of a 
professional educator.48 
Although malpractice lawsuits should be about “conduct,” 
many educational malpractice cases have focused on 
“consequences.”49 Such a wrong-headed approach makes it 
virtually impossible to prove educational malpractice, which 
makes it overly convenient for courts to dismiss educational 
malpractice claims without even evaluating “whether the 
educator rendered the instruction that would be expected of a 
professional educator.”50 
To be sure, courts have had an opportunity to hear certain 
 
QlCN (last visited May 21, 2013). 
 48 Todd A. DeMitchell, Terri A. DeMitchell, and Douglas Gagnon, Teacher 
Effectiveness and Value-Added Modeling: Building a Pathway to Educational 
Malpractice? 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 257, 296 (2012) (emphasis added).  
 49 See Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012, Ill. App. LEXIS 
133, 359, Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 Ill. App (1st) 102653 (Educational malpractice claim for 
allegedly receiving inadequate training not cognizable). Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design 
Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“The bar on educational-malpractice 
claims recognizes that ‘[a]llowing individuals . . . to assert claims of negligent 
instruction would avoid the practical reality that, in the end, it is the student who is 
responsible for his knowledge, including the limits of that knowledge.’”). See also 
Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1455–56 (D. Colo. 1994) 
(claiming that teachers were “not properly trained,” and that “school failed to provide 
adequate instruction” were construed as educational malpractice and properly 
dismissed). Johnson v. Clark, 165 Mich. App. 366, 418 N.W. 2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987); 49  Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2008) Dallas Airmotive, 277 S.W. 3d at 700; Christensen v. S. Normal Sch., 
790 So. 2d 252, 255 (Ala. 2001) (claim is barred by educational malpractice doctrine if 
the claims “require an analysis of the quality of education received”); Gupta v. New 
Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996) (claim based on 
institution’s failure to provide “adequate training” was not cognizable); Lawrence v. 
Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d 546, 713 N.E.2d 478 (court would 
not recognize any claim that educational services were “substandard” or “inadequate”). 
 50 See DeMitchell, DeMitchell, & Gagnon, supra note 48 at 296.  
Tokic Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/4/14  11:28 PM 
114 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
specific “conduct”-based cases. For example, in Bittle v. 
Oklahoma City University (OCU), the plaintiff alleged that 
his constitutional law professor frequently arrived late for 
class, discharged class early, or canceled class altogether; that 
neither the professor nor OCU provided make-up classes or 
academic counseling to assist students as OCU implicitly 
agreed; and that the failures of the professor (OCU’s agent), 
OCU and the Board in these particulars caused his academic 
dismissal.51 
On these facts, the plaintiff “asserted claims for fraud, 
breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, [and] negligence 
. . . seeking actual and punitive damages.”52 However, the court 
declined to recognize the claim based on “inadequate or 
improper instruction,”53 finding that all of the plaintiff’s claims 
commonly alleged OCU’s failure to provide him an “adequate 
legal education.” As such, the court determined the plaintiff’s 
claims were based upon a theory of “educational malpractice,” 
which Oklahoma law did not recognize in the absence of a 
specific, identifiable agreement for the provision of particular 
services.54 
In another similar case, Miller v. Loyola University of New 
Orleans, a law student sued a university for negligence and 
breach of contract based on the manner in which a faculty 
member taught a course.55 The student charged that the 
instructor failed to order course materials in a timely manner, 
that she changed the course time without the permission of law 
school officials, that she had students make class presentations 
on subjects she was obligated to teach, that she only covered 
approximately 60% of the material, that she only gave a final 
examination that consisted partly of materials from the 
National Conference of Bar Examiners, and that her original 
 
 51 2000 OK Civ. App. 66, 6 P.3d 509, 511 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000). 
 52 Id. at 512. 
 53 Id. at 515. 
 54 Id. at 515 (“. . . absent a specific, identifiable agreement for the provision of 
particular services, the public policy of this state similarly militates against recognition 
of a claim by a student against a private educational institution arising from the 
institution’s alleged improper or inadequate instruction however denominated—either 
in tort or contract—for “educational malpractice.” Notwithstanding his protestations to 
the contrary, all of Bittle’s claims for fraud, breach of contract, tortious breach of 
contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment commonly allege a willful or negligent 
failure of OCU to provide him an adequate legal education . . .”). 
 55 829 So. 2d 1057 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
Tokic Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/4/14  11:28 PM 
1] RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 115 
questions contained serious errors.56 After law school officials 
looked into the allegations, concluding that at least some of 
them had merit, the student filed suit, seeking to recover the 
cost of taking the course and reimbursement for the cost of 
taking the course a second time from a different instructor.57 
Ultimately, without even evaluating the instructor’s conduct, 
an appellate court affirmed the rejection of all of the student’s 
claims, declaring flatly, “Louisiana law does not recognize a 
cause of action for educational malpractice under contract or 
tort law.”58 In support of its conclusion, the court simply cited 
the decision from Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, and other 
general policy concerns for rejecting educational malpractice 
claims.59 
These cases seem to indicate that courts tend to view 
specific conduct-based educational malpractice cases merely as 
an attempt to mask “allegations of educational malpractice,” 60 
and “circumvent the fact that educational malpractice is not a 
recognized cause of action.”61 While it might be true that “the 
nature of education radically differs from other professions,”62 
the standards for liability in educational malpractice cases 
should not “radically differ” from standards used in other 
professions. Therefore, courts should refrain from bundling and 
generalizing claims for educational malpractice, and should 
move towards adopting an input/conduct-based approach to 
educational malpractice. The following section addresses the 
policy concerns for rejecting educational malpractice cases and 
the “bandwagon” problem. 
B. “Fiat Justitia, Ruat Coelum” 
Perhaps the biggest problem with educational malpractice 
lawsuits is the lack of independent analysis by the courts. The 
courts tend to dismiss any claim that “smells” like a claim for 
 
 56 Miller, 6 P.3d at 1058. 
 57 Id. at 1059. 
 58 Id. at 1061. 
 59 Id. at 1060.   
 60 Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d 546, 549 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“The trial court characterized Lawrence’s claims as masking 
allegations of educational malpractice, which is barred as a cause of action in this 
state.”). 
 61 Id. at 548.  
 62 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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educational malpractice simply by citing to other courts that 
have done the same.63 For example, in a very recent educational 
malpractice case from Illinois, the court stated, “[w]hile Illinois 
has not addressed whether educational malpractice claims are 
cognizable, most jurisdictions that have considered the issue 
have found that educational malpractice claims are not 
cognizable.”64 The bandwagon mentality has created a snowball 
effect that has resulted in a smothering of educational 
malpractice claims. Of course, the United States is a common-
law jurisdiction and courts ought to respect stare decisis and 
the value of legal precedents (even from other jurisdictions), 
but the courts need to recognize that not all educational 
malpractice claims are factually the same, and that the 
articulated policy concerns for rejecting educational 
malpractice claims are fairly arcane.65 In fact, the key policy 
concerns that courts keep citing were articulated in two early 
educational malpractice cases from the 1970s.66 
The main policy concerns for rejecting educational 
malpractice (the fear of a “flood of litigation,” overburdening 
the schools and the alleged difficulty in framing an appropriate 
measure of damages) were objected to in the first case in the 
United States that used the phrase “educational malpractice.”67 
Initially, it must be emphasized that the policy considerations 
enunciated in Peter W., supra, do not mandate a dismissal of 
the complaint. Whether the failure of the plaintiff to achieve a 
basic level of literacy was caused by the negligence of the 
 
 63 Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 551, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 
133, 359 Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012). (“While Illinois has not 
addressed whether educational malpractice claims are cognizable, most jurisdictions 
that have considered the issue have found that educational malpractice claims are not 
cognizable.”) (citing nine cases); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 
(1982) (“The courts have uniformly refused, based on public policy considerations, to 
enter the classroom to determine claims based upon educational malpractice.”) (citing 
seven cases); Swidryk v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, 493 A.2d 641, 642 (citing nine 
cases); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 113 (citing thirteen cases); Ross, 957 F.2d 
at 414 (citing fourteen cases in eleven states); Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 906 
(Del. 1997) (citing fifteen cases); Doe v. Yale University, 1997 WL 766845, *1 (Conn. 
Super. 1997) (citing twelve cases).  
 64 Waugh, 966 N.E.2d at 551.  
 65 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 
440, 446, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring). 
 66 Id.  
 67 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 42–43, 407 
N.Y.S.2d 874, 883–84 (1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting). 
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school system, as the plaintiff alleges, or was the product of 
forces outside the teaching process, is really a question of 
proof to be resolved at a trial. The fear of a flood of litigation, 
perhaps much of it without merit, and the possible difficulty 
in framing an appropriate measure of damages, are similarly 
unpersuasive grounds for dismissing the instant cause of 
action. Fear of excessive litigation caused by the creation of a 
new zone of liability was effectively refuted by the abolition of 
sovereign immunity many years ago, and numerous 
environmental actions fill our courts where damages are 
difficult to assess. Under the circumstances, there is no 
reason to differentiate between educational malpractice on 
the one hand, and other forms of negligence and malpractice 
litigation which currently congest our courts.68 
In the period following the early educational malpractice cases, 
scholars immediately began arguing against the flat-out 
rejection of educational malpractice claims.69 Interestingly 
enough, the House of Lords in England has rejected the public 
policy arguments advanced against educational malpractice in 
the United States. It stated, 
I am not persuaded by these fears. I do not think they provide 
sufficient reason for treating work in the classroom as 
territory which the courts must never enter. . . . 
I am not persuaded that there are sufficient grounds to 
exclude these claims even on grounds of public policy alone. It 
does not seem to me that there is any wider interest of the 
law which would require that no remedy in damages be 
available. I am not persuaded that the recognition of a 
liability upon employees of the education authority for 
damages for negligence in education would lead to a flood of 
claims, or even vexatious claims, which would overwhelm the 
school authorities, nor that it would add burdens and 
distractions to the already intensive life of teachers. Nor 
should it inspire some peculiarly defensive attitude in the 
performance of their professional responsibilities. On the 
contrary, it may have the healthy effect of securing that high 
 
 68 Id.  
 69 John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by 
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 NW. U. L. REV 641 (1978). Robert H. Jerry, II, 
Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: Problems in Theory and Practice, 29 
KAN. L. REV 195 (1981). Terrence P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the 
Teaching Profession, 11 J. LAW & EDUCATION 479 (1982) (arguing that ordinary 
negligence principles can be easily applied to educational liability actions and in fact 
would not break new ground). 
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standards are sought and secured.70 
It is worth mentioning that the public policy reasons for 
shielding educators from malpractice liability have been raised 
and rejected before in various contexts. For example, the fear of 
opening the floodgates of litigation has been used to deny 
claims for mental distress, which are now generally allowed.71 
While addressing the issue of “floodgates of litigation,” two 
respected scholars have opined: 
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, 
even at the expense of a “flood of litigation,” and it is a pitiful 
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice 
to deny relief on such grounds. That a multiplicity of actions 
may follow is not a persuasive objection; if injuries are 
multiplied, actions should be multiplied, so injured parties 
may have recompense. So far as distinguishing true claims 
from false ones is concerned, what is required is rather a 
careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting the claim; and the 
elimination of trivialities calls for nothing more than the 
same common sense which has distinguished serious from 
trifling injuries in other fields of the law.72 
These remarks have been cited in many court decisions,73 and 
some courts have used similar reasoning to recognize tort 
claims for emotional distress.74 
In addition to claims for emotional distress, it is worth 
 
 70 Phelps v. London Borough of Hillingdon; Anderton v. Clwyd County Council; 
Jarvis v. Hampshire County Council; Re G (a minor) [2000] 4 All ER 504, 530–535, 
available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000727/phelp-4.htm 
(last visited May 1, 2013). 
 71 See Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in 
the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 111–113 (2003). 
 72 KEETON et al., supra note 28, §12, at 56.  
 73 See e.g. Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Doe v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814, 823 (Md.App. 1982); Davis v. 
Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546–47 (Ore. 1978); Yandrich v. Radic, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 698, 
705–06 (Dauphin County 1979); Zentz v. Harne, 2 Pa. D. & C.5th 398, 410 (Somerset 
County 2007).  
 74 The court states, 
This court is not satisfied that a flood of litigation with fraudulent claims or the 
resurrecting of fault, or the possibility of confusing the issues of custody, support, 
and equitable distribution should deny one spouse from suing the other in a 
divorce proceeding for emotional distress without physical injury. There is neither 
valid policy interest nor logical reason to allow [it]. It is this court’s opinion that an 
independent cause of action between spouses for emotional distress without 
physical injury should exist in a divorce case. 
Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991). 
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mentioning that the public policy reasons that currently shield 
educators from malpractice liability were also rejected as a 
justification for the immunity of state and local governments 
from tort liability.75 The reasoning for ending immunity of state 
and local governments from tort liability was substantially 
similar to the reasoning for allowing claims for mental 
distress.76 
Therefore, instead of reciting and relying on the same stale 
public policy arguments that have been rejected in various 
other contexts, the courts hearing educational malpractice 
cases should acknowledge arguments against these arcane 
public policy reasons and, ultimately, follow the old legal 
principle: “Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. (Let justice be done, 
though the heavens fall).”77 The following section explores the 
grounds for holding educators liable for educational 
malpractice. 
III. HOLDING EDUCATORS LIABLE 
In addition to numerous theories of educational malpractice 
based on negligence,78 scholars and commentators have 
 
 75 Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 264 (Miss. 1979) (“We must also reject the 
fear of excessive litigation as a justification for the immunity doctrine. Empirically, 
there is little support for the concern that the courts will be flooded with litigation if 
the doctrine is abandoned. . . . More compelling than an academic debate over the 
apparent or real increases in the amount of litigation, is the fundamental concept of 
our judicial system that any such increase should not be determinative or relevant to 
the availability of a judicial forum for the adjudication of impartial individual rights.”); 
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Calif. 1961); Ayala v. Philadelphia 
Board Edu., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973); Mayle v. Penn. Dept. Highways, 388 A.2d 709 
(Pa. 1978). 
 76 See Jones, 373 So. 2d at 264. 
 77 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 111 (1978), rev’d, 400 N.E.2d 
317 (N.Y. 1979). 
 78 See, e.g., Terrance P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the 
Teaching Profession, 11 J. L. & EDUC. 479 (1982) (arguing that ordinary negligence 
principles can be easily applied to educational liability actions and, in fact, would not 
break new ground); John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms 
Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1978) (arguing 
that a cause of action for malpractice may exist but only where the conduct of 
educators is particularly egregious); William F. Foster, Educational Malpractice: A 
Tort for the Untaught?,19 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1985); Richard Funston, 
Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 743 (1981); Robert H. Jerry, II, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: 
Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 KAN. L. REV. 195 (1981); Johnny C. Parker, 
Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301 (1991) (arguing that 
proximate cause can be proven in an educational malpractice claim and should not 
serve as a barrier to such actions); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban 
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frequently explored other grounds for holding educators liable. 
For example, some commentators have argued that courts 
should be willing to adopt a contractual framework for 
administering litigation involving educational liability issues, 
and the courts can look to three theories of contract law for 
administering suits against schools: express contract, 
promissory estoppel, and third-party beneficiary.79 It was 
suggested that express contract law can be applied to nearly all 
aspects of the student-school relationship at nearly all levels, 
but, if courts are unwilling to adopt a rigid contract approach, 
the more flexible theories of promissory estoppel and third-
party beneficiary should be applied.80 The focus of promissory 
estoppel in an educational liability action is on the reasonable 
reliance by the parents and students of an educational 
institution’s “promises,”81 while a third-party beneficiary claim 
could enable the plaintiff to argue that she was the beneficiary 
of the contract between educational institutions and the 
teachers.82 
 
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1985) 
(advocating class action suits for educational malpractice by students in school systems 
where 50% or more of the students are below national education levels); Judith H. 
Berliner Cohen, The ABC’s of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally 
Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293 (1978); Joan Blackburn, Educational 
Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1978); Karen H. 
Calavenna, Comment, Educational Malpractice, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 717 (1987); Laurie 
S. Jamieson, Educational Malpractice: A Lesson in Professional Accountability, 32 B.C. 
L. REV. 899 (1991); Alice J. Klein, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy 
the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (1979) 
(arguing that minimum competency standards might be used to establish a duty of care 
in educational malpractice actions); Michael A. Magone, Educational Malpractice—
Does the Cause of Action Exist?, 49 MONT. L. REV. 140 (1988); Daryl A. Nelson, 
Educational Malpractice, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 261 (1981); Destin S. Tracy, 
Educational Negligence: A Student’s Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic 
Instruction, 58 N.C. L. REV. 561 (1980); Edward J. Wallison Jr., Note, Nonliability for 
Negligence in the Public Schools—“Educational Malpractice” from Peter W. to 
Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980); Kimberly A. Wilkins, Educational 
Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Need of a Call for Action, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 427 
(1988) (advocating that courts permit educational malpractice claims); Nancy L. 
Woods, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 
TULSA L.J. 383 (1978) (arguing that competency-based education laws provide a duty of 
care in educational malpractice claims); Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A 
Tort en Ventre, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323 (1991) (arguing that professional malpractice 
claims are inappropriate in the field of education in part because educators are not 
professional). 
 79 See McJessy, supra note 22.  
 80 Id. at 1815–1816. 
 81 Id. at 1804–1807 (describing in detail promissory estoppel claims).  
 82 Id. at 1807–1810 (describing in detail third-party beneficiary claims).  
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Other commentators have previously proposed other 
creative approaches. One commentator has compared the 
nature of decision-making engaged in by educators in the 
educational malpractice context to decision-making by 
corporate management.83 She suggested that the two are 
comparable, as the judiciary hesitates to intervene in both 
contexts because “it does not want to infringe upon the policy-
making domain of corporate directors and educators.”84 
However, unlike corporate directors that enjoy qualified 
immunity for poor decision-making under the “business 
judgment rule,” educators currently enjoy complete immunity.85 
This commentator also suggested that the principle for liability 
of corporate directors could be used in the education setting, 
which would end the absolute immunity of educators and, 
ultimately, make educators accountable for conduct that 
amounts to gross negligence.86 
There have been other very “unique” approaches to 
educational liability. For example, one commentator has 
proposed a conceptualization of educational liability based on 
the correlation between property values and school 
performance.87 Under this approach, it was suggested that the 
proper plaintiff in a suit for educational liability should be a 
class composed of property owners, not necessarily students or 
parents and that, ultimately, courts should embrace the 
liability of educational institutions to local property owners, 
instead of contemplating the liability of educational 
institutions to students.88 The property-ownership approach is 
mainly concerned with “big decisions” of the administrators, 
and is based on the assumption that poor performance of 
students in the school to which residents of a property are 
assigned under the local school district’s residential 
assignment scheme reduces the value of their property.89 
In spite of the various creative theories for holding 
 
 83 Cheryl L. Wade, Educators Who Drive With No Hands: The Application of 
Analytical Concepts of Corporate Law in Certain Cases of Educational Malpractice, 32 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 441 (1995).  
 84 Id. at 441.  
 85 Id. at 449–450.  
 86 Id. at 452–455. 
 87 Geoffrey Rapp, Reconsidering Educational Liability: Property-Owners as 
Litigants, Constructive Trust as Remedy, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463 (2000).  
 88 Id. at 464, 473. 
 89 Id. 
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educators liable, the issue of educational malpractice is still in 
status quo. In fact, the issue is likely to remain in status quo 
until it is resolved as to whether a “ticket” to a classroom 
entitles a “purchaser” to more than a right to enter and remain 
in the classroom during the scheduled class, or in other words, 
whether a “ticket” to a classroom entitles a “purchaser” to any 
level of quality of educational services. Consequently, in order 
to determine what kind and level of quality a purchaser of a 
“ticket” to a classroom might be entitled to, it is necessary to 
define “quality” in the educational context. 
A. “What the Hell is Quality?”90 
As noted by one commentator, “we all have an intuitive 
understanding of what quality means but it is often hard to 
articulate. Quality, like ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’, 
is a slippery concept.”91 Recognizing that the concept of quality 
has not been adequately explored, at least in the context of 
education, some commentators have sought to define the 
nature and the concept of quality.92 In a widely cited article, 
“Defining Quality,” Harvey and Green have identified five 
categories or ways to define quality. As cited in another article, 
the definition of quality can be summarized as follows:93 
 
Exception “The exceptional notion of quality takes as 
axiomatic that quality is something special. 
There are three variations of this. First, the 
traditional notion of quality as distinctive, 
second, a view of quality as embodied in 
excellence (that is, exceeding very high 
standards) and third, a weaker notion of 
exceptional quality, as passing a set of 
required (minimum) standards.” 
 
Perfection  This approach sees quality in terms of 
consistency. “It focuses on process and sets 
 
 90 CHRISTOPHER BALL, “FITNESS FOR PURPOSE: ESSAYS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
96–102 (Dorma Urwin ed., SRHE & NFER/Nelson 1985) (“What the Hell is Quality?”).  
 91 See Lee Harvey & Diana Green, Defining Quality, ASSESSMENT AND 
EVALUATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr.1993, at 9–34. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. See also Kim Watty, When will Academics Learn about Quality?, QUALITY 
IN HIGHER ED., 2003, at 213–221. 
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specifications that it aims to meet perfectly. 
This is encapsulated in two interrelated 
dictums: zero defects and getting things right 
first time.” 
 
Fitness for 
Purpose 
This approach “relates quality to the purpose 
of a product or service.” It suggests that 
“quality only has meaning in relation to the 
purpose of the product or service. Quality is 
thus judged in terms of the extent to which 
the product or service fits its purpose. This 
notion is quite remote from the idea of quality 
as something special, distinctive, elitist, 
conferring status or difficult to attain.” 
 
Value for 
Money 
This approach focuses on “efficiency and 
effectiveness,” measuring outputs against 
inputs, and it is a populist notion of quality 
(government). 
 
Transformation “A qualitative change; education is about 
doing something to the student as opposed to 
something for the consumer. Includes concepts 
of enhancing and empowering: 
democratization of the process, not just 
outcomes.” 
 
 
It has been suggested that “fitness for purpose” and 
“transformation” are the two most appropriate definitions of 
quality in the context of education.94 As noted above, “fitness 
for purpose” relates quality to the purpose of a product or 
service and, therefore, “quality only has meaning in relation to 
the purpose of the product or service.”95 However, some 
commentators have pointed out that although straightforward 
in theory, “fitness for purpose” is deceptive because it raises the 
questions of: “whose purpose?” and “how is fitness assessed?”96 
 
 94 Laurie Lomas, Presentation: The End of Quality?, Society for Research in 
Higher Education Conference (SRHE) Annual Conference, May 25–26 2001, 
Birmingham, UK. 
 95 See Harvey and Green, supra note 91.   
 96 GRAEME C. MOODIE, STANDARDS AND CRITERIA IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1–8 
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To address these issues, the “fitness for purpose” approach 
“offers two alternative priorities for specifying the purpose.” 
The first priority focuses on customers, while the second one 
focuses on the provider. It has been suggested that, “the tricky 
issue of determining who are the customers of education and 
what their requirements are can be circumscribed by returning 
the emphasis to the institution.”97 Under this approach, instead 
of focusing on meeting customer requirements, quality can be 
defined in terms of the institution fulfilling its own stated 
objectives, or mission.98 Although focusing on the institution 
can help with defining quality in the context of “fitness for 
purpose,” the provider-centered approach has its limitations 
because it is not easy to determine whether an institution is 
achieving its enumerated purposes, which brings into question 
the role of quality assurance. It has been proffered that, as an 
alternative to the subjective assessment of achievement of 
purpose, “quality assurance is about ensuring that there are 
mechanisms, procedures and processes in place to ensure that 
the desired quality, however defined and measured, is 
delivered.”99 Obviously, the critical assumption is that “if 
mechanisms exist, quality can be assured,” so the main 
emphasis is on having quality control mechanisms in place.100 
B. Articulating Educational Malpractice Based on a “Fitness 
for Purpose” Definition of Quality: What Should Courts Look 
for? 
The long line of failed educational malpractice cases that 
were based on “failure to learn” clearly establishes that 
students are not entitled to a “quality” education.101 While some 
notable experts have long used the term instructional 
negligence in order to more accurately characterize this area of 
education law,102 some decisions indicate that students are also 
not entitled to a “quality” instructor.103 However, what about 
 
(Guildford, SRHE & NF Nelson 1986).  
 97 See Harvey and Green, supra note 91.  
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Id.   
 101 See supra notes 63–64.  
 102 MARTHA M, MCCARTHY ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 89 (4th ed.1992). 
 103 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, 2000 OK CIV APP 66, 6 P.3d 509, 
511–515. See also Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans, 829 So. 2d 1057, 1060–
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“fitness for purpose” as a definition of quality in educational 
context? Are students at least entitled to an institution that 
has and enforces quality assurance mechanisms, procedures, 
and processes designed to fulfill its own stated objectives, 
mission, and obligations? One would certainly hope so. The 
following section articulates the possible tort cause of action 
against educational institutions based on the “fitness for 
purpose” definition of quality. 
1. Educational malpractice based on institutional negligence 
The reason for unsuccessful lawsuits against educational 
institutions just might be the fact that a cause of action against 
educators is known as “educational malpractice,” which 
inherently places “education,” and consequently the conduct of 
a teacher, at the center of analysis. However, exploring an 
alternative cause of action known as institutional negligence 
can alleviate this problem. The cause of action for institutional 
negligence originated in medical malpractice litigation, where 
courts reasoned that “hospitals have an independent duty to 
assume responsibility for the care of their patients.”104 For 
example, in a fairly recent case, Oscar Salinas v. Advocate 
Health and Hospital Corp., the plaintiff filed a medical 
malpractice lawsuit against both Dr. Ramillo and the Advocate 
Christ Hospital for improper treatment of his knee injury.105 
Shortly after filling the lawsuit, the plaintiff dismissed 
Advocate Christ Hospital from the medical malpractice lawsuit, 
but then brought an institutional negligence lawsuit against 
Advocate Christ Hospital the following year.106 The medical 
malpractice lawsuit against the doctor focused on the doctor’s 
negligence, while the institutional negligence lawsuit dealt 
with allegations that the hospital should have had policies and 
procedures in place to prevent certain errors from occurring.107 
Notably, in addition to hospitals, health maintenance 
 
61 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
 104 Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 721, 723 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007). See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 
253 (Ill. 1965); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000). 
 105 See, Robert Kreisman, Jury Verdict for Plaintiff Over Institutional Negligence 
Where Hospital Lacked Policy About Patient Notification of Revised Reports—Salinas v. 
Advocate, CHI. MED. MALPRACTICE ATT’Y BLOG (November 29, 2011), 
http://www.chicagomedicalmalpracticeattorney-blog.com/2011/11/. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
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organizations (“HMOs”) have also been held liable under the 
doctrine of institutional negligence, based on their procedures 
for scheduling medical treatments and their practices for 
assigning patients to a particular doctor.108 
While the notion of institutional negligence has been 
challenged in some contexts, such as in the context of tort 
liability of religious institutions,109 the concept of institutional 
negligence could be very useful in the educational context. 
Using the concept of institutional negligence in the education 
industry would put the “processes” at the center of attention, 
instead of the most direct input (instructors’ conduct) or output 
(students’ learning). Switching focus to internal rules, policies, 
and quality assurance mechanisms inherently eliminates the 
most-often mentioned obstacles in educational malpractice 
cases, which include the inability to prove breach of duty due to 
the lack of a uniform standard of care when it comes to 
evaluating teaching methodology, and the “practical 
impossibility [to] prove that the alleged malpractice of the 
teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the 
plaintiff student.”110 The following section will address issues 
related to proving institutional negligence in the education 
industry. 
C. Proving Institutional Negligence in the Educational 
Context 
Educational institutions, especially universities, usually 
provide significant informational materials about themselves, 
available either in print form or online. These materials can be 
 
 108 See Jones, 730 N.E.2d, at 1123–24 (Count I of the plaintiff’s second amended 
complaint alleged that Chicago HMO was institutionally negligent for “assigning Dr. 
Jordan as Shawndale’s primary care physician while he was serving an overloaded 
patient population [and for] adopting procedures that required Jones to call first for an 
appointment before visiting the doctor’s office or obtaining emergency care.”). See also 
Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“When a benefits 
provider, be it an insurer or managed care organization, interjects itself into the 
rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care it must do so in a medically 
reasonable manner.”). For more information on this issue, see Karen M. Coulson, 
Institutional Negligence and the HMO: The Expanding Realm of HMO Liability in 
Illinois: Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000), 26 S. ILL. 
U. L. J. 597 (2002).  
 109 Robert S. Marx, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step 
Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431 (2012). 
 110 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 446, 391 N.E.2d 
1352, 1355 (1979). 
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course catalogs with course descriptions, faculty handbooks 
that specify faculty obligations and expectations, and so on. 
While it may be unreasonable to hold educational institutions 
liable for general claims of “failure to learn,” educational 
institutions should not escape liability if they fail to implement 
and enforce policies and procedures that ought to assure 
“fitness for purpose” quality. For example, faculty handbooks 
can oblige faculty members to attend all classes, to begin and 
end classes at the scheduled times, to meet for the full duration 
of the academic term, to provide reasonable choices for classes 
to be “made-up,” to distribute and follow the course syllabus, to 
follow administrative procedures with respect to exams, to 
make themselves available to students, and other similar 
items.111 
It is true that rules and policies like these primarily define 
the contractual relationship between an educational institution 
and an instructor, but nonetheless, they can be viewed as a 
quality assurance mechanism. Consequently, if rules and 
policies like the ones mentioned above exist, reasonable steps 
should be taken to ensure that they are honored and enforced. 
If such policies do not exist, this unlikely omission alone could 
be a basis for institutional negligence. Ultimately, if an 
instructor does not follow internal policies and, as a result, a 
particular course ends up not matching relevant syllabi and/or 
a course description, the fault should fall not only on the 
instructor, but also on the institution due to the lack of 
enforcement of internal policies that ought to preclude such a 
scenario. The principle from the medical industry, where a 
malpractice lawsuit against an individual most directly 
responsible for wrongdoing can be completely different from a 
negligence lawsuit against an institution that allowed certain 
wrongdoings to happen,112 can and should be applied in the 
 
 111 See Professional Policies & Faculty Responsibilities—Basic Expectations of the 
Faculty Position, UNIV. OF IOWA, http://clas.uiowa.edu/faculty/professional-policies-
faculty-responsibilities-basic-expectations-faculty-position  (last visited May 21, 2013); 
See also Faculty Performance Expectations, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, 
www.shu.edu/academics/business/upload/ASCEXPT_RPT.pdf (last visited May 21, 
2013); See also Brownsville Middle School Faculty Handbook, 
http://brownsville.dadeschools.net (last visited May 21, 2013); see also, Faculty 
Employment Obligations and Expectations, NORTHEASTERN  ILL. UNIV., 
http://www.neiu.edu/DOCUMENTS/Faculty_Staff/Faculty_Resources/Policies/FEOE.pd
f (last visited May 21, 2013). 
 112 See Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 721, 723 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007). See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 
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education industry. 
Cases like Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans and 
Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, for instance, are good 
examples of cases that are about not only instructors’ 
malpractice, but also institutional negligence.113 In these cases 
students alleged that, among other things, the instructors 
changed the course time without the permission of law school 
officials, covered approximately only 60% of the material that 
ought to be covered,114 frequently arrived late for class, 
discharged class early, canceled class altogether, and failed to 
provide make-up classes.115 Interestingly enough, the faculty 
handbook for Loyola University, for example, provides that 
“each faculty member shall observe duly promulgated 
regulations concerning such matters as the cancellation of 
scheduled classes, examinations, . . . [and] current syllabi.”116 
The relevant legal analysis in these types of scenarios should 
focus on institutions’ mechanisms, or the lack of mechanisms, 
for preventing the educational missteps mentioned above. 
Failure to separate claims for instructional malpractice/ 
negligence from claims for institutional negligence, and the 
tendency to label both claims as regular educational 
malpractice claims (based on a “failure to learn”) is, legally and 
logically speaking, unsound. Treating these two claims the 
same is akin to mixing apples and oranges on the principle that 
both are fruit. 
Clearly, the discussion above is more applicable to post-
secondary educational institutions, but the underlying 
principle of institutional negligence can be applied to primary 
and secondary education, albeit on different grounds. In fact, 
two distinguished commentators have very recently introduced 
some new ideas regarding educators’ liability in primary and 
secondary education that are conceptually based on 
 
N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 
2000).  
 113 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, 2000 OK CIV APP 66, 6 P.3d 509, 
511–515. See also Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans, 829 So. 2d 1057, 1060–
61 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
 114 Miller, 829 So. 2d at 1057.  
 115 Bittle, 6 P.3d at 511. 
 116 (“Each faculty member shall observe duly promulgated regulations concerning 
such matters as the cancellation of scheduled classes, examinations, grades, current 
syllabi, teaching assignments, contact hours, full-time employment, and assessment 
and development of the curriculum.”). See http://academicaffairs.loyno.edu/faculty-
handbook, p7–2. 
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institutional negligence. In particular, Hutt and Tang argue 
that educators today operate with access to unparalleled 
amounts of data concerning teacher effectiveness and teacher 
impacts on student learning.117 Consequently, instead of 
seeking to hold educators liable for negligence claims based on 
instructional negligence and failure to learn, a plaintiff should 
seek to hold a school district liable for its negligence one step 
earlier, that is, assignment to a classroom taught by a teacher 
whom school officials know to be ineffective based on extensive 
statistical data concerning the teacher’s performance.118 This 
approach is clearly based on institutional negligence. 
IV. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF INSTITUTIONAL NEGLIGENCE IN 
THE EDUCATION INDUSTRY 
A. Academic Freedom and “Burger King” Issues 
One could argue that administrators’ fear of liability for 
institutional negligence has the ability to trigger far too much 
overseeing, which could interfere with the academic freedom 
rights of the faculty. Nothing could be more distant from the 
truth and the law. Academic freedom in the United States has 
long been deemed a “special concern of the First 
Amendment.”119 As such, academic freedom rights essentially 
provide that faculty members be entitled to freedom in 
discussing their curriculum subject, freedom in research and 
publication, and freedom to speak or write as citizens.120 To be 
 
 117 Ethan Hutt & Aaron Tang, The New Education Malpractice Litigation, 99 VA. 
L. REV. 419, 425–27 (2013). 
 118 Id.  
 119 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of transcendent value to 
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special 
concern of the First Amendment . . . ”). See also Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment.”).  
 120 See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS., 1940 STATEMENT 
OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM  AND TENURE 3 (1940), 
http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure 
(last visited May 23, 2013). Even though the 1940 Statement is merely a restatement of 
principles and, as such, it serves as a guideline, and not binding law, the AAUP does 
“enforce” the Statement in a way by listing colleges and universities that it finds to be 
in violation of the 1940 Statement. See generally AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 
CENSURE LIST, AAUP, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/censuredadmins/ (last visited 
May 23, 2013). 
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sure, it is worth noting that the exact legal basis and 
implications of academic freedom rights are subject to much 
debate,121 and courts have distinguished the importance of 
academic freedom in tertiary, as opposed to in primary and 
secondary education.122 Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that 
academic freedom could ever be invoked in situations where a 
central issue is whether a faculty member is doing what he or 
she is supposed to do based on rules and policies that define 
employment-related expectations and obligations. If academic 
freedom could be applied in such situations, then faculty 
members could decide to teach only when it is not raining. 
Interestingly enough, one professor has noted, “[s]orry kids, 
you are not the authority in the classroom. Me Teacher. You 
student. Me Teach, you learn. End of discussion . . . Education 
is not a business. You are not my customer. My classroom is 
not Burger King. You do not get to ‘have it your way.’”123 
Although powerful and rather insightful, the problem with this 
statement is the emphasis on “my classroom.” Since classrooms 
where classes are held actually belong to the educational 
institution, the faculty members should also realize that a 
classroom is not Burger King and, just like students, they do 
 
 121 See David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” 
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 
237 (1990) (“Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first amendment is in 
many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The term ‘academic freedom,’ in 
obvious contrast to ‘freedom of the press,’ is nowhere mentioned in the text of the first 
amendment.”). See also Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the 
First Amendment”, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 252–53 (1989). The author states, 
The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition stands 
explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in fervid 
rhetoric. Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a constitutional 
guarantee of academic freedom, however, generally result in paradox or confusion. 
The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the promise of rhetoric 
reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic life. The problems are 
fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the 
Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding 
principle, the doctrine floats in law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles. 
 122  The majority opinion in Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City 
Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 343–44 (6th Cir. 2010). The court stated, 
As a cultural and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and 
implemented in the university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are also 
researchers or scholars-work not generally expected of elementary and secondary 
school teachers.’ . . . ‘[U]niversities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition’ and the constitutional rules applicable in higher education do not 
necessarily apply in primary and secondary schools, where students generally do 
not choose whether or where they will attend school.  
 123 Stanley Fish, Student Evaluations, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 28, 
2010, 9PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/student-evaluations-part-
two/. 
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not get to ‘have it your way.’” The faculty can “have it” only in 
accordance with internal rules and policies of the institution 
they work for. Academic freedom is not a route to avoid 
employment expectations and obligations. 
B. Burden on School Administrators 
The standard for legal liability based on negligence is 
“knew, or should have known.”124 One could feasibly argue that 
the legal standard for negligence would put an undue burden 
on administrators, as it is almost impossible for administrators 
to keep up with each and every instructor within an institution 
on a daily basis, especially in large institutions. These concerns 
would perhaps be legitimate if institutional negligence lawsuits 
in the educational context were based on traditional “failure to 
learn,” as administrators would regularly have to monitor 
students’ learning. However, unlike educational malpractice, 
institutional negligence is primarily concerned with 
implementing and enforcing internal rules and policies that 
ought to ensure that an instructor is doing what he or she is 
supposed to do. Consequently, any major disturbance for 
administrators is unlikely, because it is highly probable that 
administrators will know about instructors’ (mis)conduct prior 
to a potential lawsuit. That is so because students and/or 
parents are likely to report to administrators any serious 
misconduct on the part of an instructor, such as frequent 
absences, unreasonable tardiness, improper behavior, not 
following the syllabus, and so on. Moreover, the administrators 
have access to student evaluations that could point out 
violations of relevant rules and policies. Therefore, it is more 
likely than not that administrators will learn about instructors’ 
(mis)conduct without a daily run-around, and prior to a lawsuit 
for institutional negligence. 
In reality, the added pressure to implement and enforce 
internal mechanisms for preventing errors would likely affect 
student evaluations, which are one of the heartiest issues in 
the education industry.125 For teachers, unfavorable 
 
 124 The “knew or should have known” standard has long been used in a great 
number of negligence-based cases. See e.g. Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 
1961); Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 
192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 
(1951). 
 125 See Fish, supra note 123. See also Jonah E. Rockoff, Subjective and Objective 
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evaluations “can destroy a career that took a decade to train 
for.”126 On the other hand, the nature of some student 
evaluations can cause administrators to refrain from even 
criticizing teachers for unsatisfactory evaluations because that 
could “potentially result in years (if not decades) of bitterness 
between those involved.”127 Without question, poor student 
evaluations can cause tensions between teachers and students, 
teachers and administrators, and students and administrators. 
Arguably, the best way to reduce the negative impact of 
student evaluations is to make them more objective, and the 
best way to make them more objective is to ensure that student 
evaluations predominantly address the issue of whether a 
teacher is doing what he or she is supposed to do. In all 
fairness, students might not always be well positioned to judge 
whether a teacher possesses mastery of his or her subject area, 
whether a teacher is clear, well prepared, or generally caring. 
However, students are exceptionally well positioned to answer 
questions related to teachers’ absences, tardiness, following the 
syllabus, making-up classes, holding office hours, and so on. 
Consequently, the added pressure to enforce internal rules and 
policies would likely prompt educational institutions to seek 
direct input from those on the “ground.” Such a scenario would 
inherently add more objectivity to student evaluations, which 
would be a desirable trend, as many studies point to the overly 
subjective nature of student evaluations.128 
 
Evaluations of Teacher Effectiveness, AM. ECON. REV., May 2010, at 261–266. 
 126 Fish, supra note 123. 
 127 Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban 
Students from Teachers’ Unions, 201163 ALA. L. REV. 177, 195 (2011). The author 
states, 
Principals cannot fire ineffective teachers, and apparently they are afraid even to 
criticize them, which would potentially result in years (if not decades) of bitterness 
between those involved. Farcically, in schools that rate teachers as either 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory, “about 99 percent of all teachers in the United 
States are rated ‘satisfactory.’” Even when evaluations utilize a broader rating 
scale than just satisfactory and unsatisfactory, one study showed that ninety-four 
percent of teachers received one of the top-two ratings while less than one percent 
of teachers were deemed to have performed unsatisfactorily. As a result, 
exceptional teachers do not get recognized (or rewarded), average teachers are not 
given feedback on what specifically they should improve, and poor teachers are 
generally retained regardless of whether they make improvements. 
 128 See e.g. Samer Kherfi, Whose opinion is it anyway? Determinants of 
Participation in Student Evaluation of Teaching, J. OF ECON. EDUC., Aug. 2011, at 19–
30; See also Ingrid Farreras & Robert Boyle, The Effect of Faculty Self-Promotion on 
Student Evaluations of Teaching, COLL. STUD. J., June 2012, at 314–322; See also Scott 
Freng & David Webber, Turning up the heat on online teaching evaluations: Does 
“hotness” matter? TCHN. OF PSYCHOL., 2009, at 189–193; See also John Adams, Student 
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V. CONCLUSION 
William Bennett, the former United States Secretary of 
Education, stated more than 25 years ago, “[t]here are greater, 
more certain, and more immediate penalties in this country for 
serving up a single rotten hamburger than for furnishing a 
thousand schoolchildren with a rotten education.”129 Since then, 
scholars have actively sought to articulate various legal 
theories of educational malpractice, but the courts have 
consistently been reluctant to recognize claims for educational 
malpractice, on both legal and policy grounds. Consequently, a 
“ticket” to a classroom still does not entitle a student to more 
than a right to be there for a certain period of time, and it is 
practically impossible to hold educators accountable for the 
quality of their performance. Educators are indeed treated like 
rock stars under the current approach to educational 
malpractice. 
This Article has argued in favor of adopting the concept of 
institutional negligence in the educational context as a way of 
enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of educational 
institutions. Using the concept of institutional negligence in 
the education industry would put institutions’ “processes” for 
assuring the desired “fitness for purpose” quality at the center 
of attention, instead of the most direct input (instructors’ 
conduct) or output (students’ learning). Switching focus to 
quality assurance mechanisms inherently eliminates the most-
often mentioned obstacle in educational malpractice cases, 
namely, the inability to prove breach of duty due to the lack of 
a uniform standard of care when it comes to evaluating 
teaching methodology. Consequently, the courts would finally 
have a chance to adequately address damages in the context of 
educational malpractice, which could ultimately clarify the 
parameters of educators’ obligations towards students. 
 
 
 
 
Evaluations: The Ratings Game, INQUIRY, Fall 1997, at 10–16.  
 129 John N. Maclean, Indiana Makes Book on Theory of Education Reform, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 4, 1987, Section C at 1, 4. 
